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Summary  findings
Since its transition to a market economy began, Russia  regions account for more than 2.5 percent of the
has not attracted much foreign direct investment (FDI).  country's  FDI and most account for much less.
Inflows of FDI into Russia are much lower than those  Surprisingly, neither policymakers nor observers and
into other transition countries in the region, adjusted for  analysts have paid much attention to diagnosing the
population size and similar measures. Clearly, if Russia is  reason for this imbalance in FDI's distribution.
to grow it must increase the level of FDI inflows, which  Broadman and Recanatini try to empirically unbundle
is why a good deal of policy attention has focused on the  the determinants of FDI's regional distribution within
problem.  Russia. They find that factors associated with market
Equally important  for achieving sustainable growth in  size, infrastructure development, and the policy
such a large, heterogeneous economy is learning how to  environment seem to explain much of the observed
make the spatial distribution of FDI within Russia more  variation in FDI flows to regions in Russia.
even. Inflows are strikingly skewed. Close to 60 percent  Moreover, the explanatory power of the model that
of FDI goes to four regions in the western part of the  best explains cross-regional variation in FDI flows from
country-Moscow  City, Moscow oblast, St. Petersburg,  1995 to 1998 changes significantly after the 1998 default
and Leningrad oblast-which  account for only 22  and ruble devaluation-suggesting  the possibility of a
percent of Russia's gross national product and only 13  "structural change" in the determinants of FDI after the
percent of Russia's population.  Only two of the other 85  1998 crisis.
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an important engine of growth.  In today's globalized economy,
virtually all countries-and  especially developing and transition countries-are  increasingly vying with
each other for greater amounts of FDI inflows.  FDI provides a package of financial capital, technology,
managerial skills, information, and goods and services that can make an economy more competitive in
the world marketplace,  promoting growth and reducing poverty.'
Russia's  poor record for attracting FDI since the advent of its reform in the early 1990s is well
known. Despite the country's large endowment of rich natural resources, highly educated labor force, and
potentially large market, Russia has received relatively small amounts of FDI. At the  start of 2000,
cumulative net FDI inflows to Russia totaled about US$  11 billion. 2 This level of FDI is very low
relative to other transition countries in the region, adjusted for population size (or similar normalizing
measures).  On a per capita basis, cumulative net FDI inflows to Russia from 1992-99 are US$ 71,
compared to US$ 511 for Poland, US$ 1493  for the Czech Republic and US$ 1581 for Hungary. 3 Clearly
one key growth challenge for Russia's authorities is to improve the country's investment environment to
increase the level of FDI inflows, and thus much policy attention has been focused on this problem. 4
Equally important for Russia in terms of achieving sustainable growth is how to ensure a more
even spatial distribution of FDI within the country.  FDI inflows to Russia are strikingly skewed.  Four
regions5-Moscow  City, Moscow oblast, St. Petersburg, and Leningrad oblast-account  for substantially
more than half of total inflows of FDI.6 Moreover, all these regions are relatively close together in the
western part of the country. Few of Russia's remaining 85 regions are recipients of FDI to any significant
degree. While other large, heterogeneous  transition economies-notably  China7-exhibit  uneven patterns
of FDI, the skewed geographical distribution of Russia's FDI is quite pronounced.  The benefits of FDI
so  unevenly dispersed may  well  not contribute effectively to  a  regional pattern  of investment and
industrial  development that  would  engendered  enduring  growth.  Indeed,  it  is  arguable  that  the
unevenness in the distribution of FDI to  date is contributing to the  skewed pattern of the country's
regional economic development as well as other discrepancies between the regions.  These problems
I  See,  among  others,  UNCTAD  (1999),  Stem  (2000),  World  Bank  (2001). JP Morgan  (1998)  estimates  that among
transition  economies,  a 1.0  percentage  point  increase  in  FDI (measured  as a proportion  of GDP),  increases  per
capita  income  by 0.8  percent.
2 Foreign  capital  flows  to and from  Russia  are monitored  by both  Goskomstat  (the State  Committee  for Statistics)
and  the Central  Bank  of Russia  (CBR).  Goskomstat  relies  on customs  statistics  and  special  questionnaires.
CBR  takes  into  account  Goskomstat  data but also  uses  its own  system  for  monitoring  capital  operations  of
banks. Therefore  the data  of the two  agencies  may  differ  but generally  are of the same  magnitude.  Except
where  noted,  in our  analysis  we  rely on Goskomstat  data.
3For  these  cross-country  comparisons  we relied  on  the data  in the EBRD's  most  recent  Transition  report  (EBRD,
2000).
4For  a discussion  of the policy  issues  see Bergsman,  Broadman  and  Drebenstov  (1999)  and  OECD  (2001).
5In  this  paper  we use  the term "region"  to cover  the 89 oblasts,  krais,  republics,  Federal-level  cities  and other
jurisdictions  that  define  the commonly  known  "subjects  of the Russian  Federation".
6 See  Tables  5 and  6.
7See  Broadman  and Sun  (1997).
3present the Russian authorities with challenges to overcome if FDI is to help sustain Russia's growth and
further its transition to a market economy.
Surprisingly, assessing empirically why there  is such an uneven pattern of FDI among Russia's
regions has received relatively little attention-either  from policy makers or analysts.'  This paper, using
the region as the unit of analysis, attempts to shed light on this issue.  We develop a set of hypotheses
about the determinants of the distribution of FDI within Russia (although they are generally applicable to
most countries), and test them using data for the period 1994-1999. Our hypotheses center on the notion
that regions differ not only in terms of economic dimensions, infrastructure development and geography,
but also with respect to policy, institutional, and political elements.  We believe a focus on these latter
factors is especially important in transition economies insofar as-especially  at the regional level--basic
market  institutions  are  still  nascent  and  political  economy problems  are  rife,  and  that  there  are
pronounced differences among regions along both of these dimensions.
The paper is structured as follows.  Section II  presents an overview of the recent trend in the
flow and stock of FDI in Russia, placing it in the worldwide, national and regional contexts.  Section III
reviews existing theories of determinants of FDI, outlines our hypotheses, and describes the data and the
variables we employ.  The empirical results of the econometric tests of our hypotheses are discussed in
Section IV.  Section V summarizes the main findings and  suggestions for extensions of our research.
I.  Trends and Distribution of FDI for Russia
World and Regional Trends and Distribution of FDI 9
Gross inflows of FDI on a global basis greatly increased in the 1990s relative to the previous
decade.  As shown in Table 1, developed countries continue to be the largest recipients of FDI; they also
experienced a  greater rate of increase in inflows relative to developing and transition countries.  The
share of total developing and transition country FDI inflows accounted for by CEE and CIS countries
increased from an annual average of 7 percent during  1985-95 to  10 percent in 1999.  Of this total,
Russia's  shares of inflows of FDI rose only slightly, from just  under an annual average of 1 percent
during 1985-95  to just  over 1 percent in 1999.  1997 marked the greatest annual gross inflows of FDI to
Russia to date-US$  6 billion.
Data on gross outflows of FDI are presented in Table 2. Not surprisingly, developed economies
are the largest source countries for FDI, with their share increasing over the decade. The CEE and CIS
countries as a whole increased their share in gross outflows of FDI among developing and transition
8  Bradshaw  (1995)  contains  an early  comprehensive  description  of the spatial  distribution  of FDI  within  Russia,  but
does not  attempt  to explain  statistically  the observed  patterns.  Ahrend  (1999)  focuses  on differentials  in growth
performance  across  the regions,  using  the level  of FDI in  each region  as an explanatory  variable.  A recent
Master  thesis  by Manankov  (2000)  focuses  on many  of the same  issues  as we do; however,  while  we analyze
the differentials  in  flows  of FDI  to a region,  he analyzes  the number  of foreign  joint ventures  established  in
each  region.
9 For the analysis  of world  and regional  data on FDI  flows  and  stocks  we use  UJNCTAD  (2000)  data,  which  are the
most  up-to-date  and  comprehensive  data currently  available  for this  purpose.  UNCTAD  relies  on  data from  the
CBR and  its own  staff  estimates.
4economies  since the  mid-1980s.  Reflective of the  well-known problem of  capital flight, Russia's
outflows of FDI account for a large portion of CEE and CIS outflows.
Table 1: Global Gross FDI Flows: Inward
(billions of dollars and percenta es)
1985-95  1996  1997  1998  1999
annual  average  199___
World  182.6 (100%)  377.5  473.1  680.1  865.5 (100%)
Developed  Countries  129.3  (71%)  219.8  275.2  480.6  636.4  (73%)
Developing  & Transition  Countries  50.1  /27%t  145.0  178.8  179.5  207.6  (24%)
CEE  and  CIS  3.6  (7.0%)°  15.2  22.1  23.1  24.2 (10%)'
Russia  0.4  (0.8%)  2.5  6.6  2.8  2.9  (L.4%)/
Hungary  I.I  (2.2%)*  2.3  2.2  2.0  1.9  (8.0%)'
Poland  0.8  (1.6%)*  4.5  4.9  6.4  7.5  (1.0%)
China  11.7  (23.0%)  40.2  44.2  43.8  40.4 (19.0%)*
India  0.5  (1.0%)  2.4  3.6  2.6  2.2  (1.0%)*
Brazil  1.8 (3.6%)*  10.5  18.7  28.5  31.4 (15.0%)
* Percentage  of total  developing  and transition  countries'  flows
Source: UNCTAD  (2000)
Table 2:  Global Gross FDI Flows: Outward
(billions of dollars and percentages)
1985-95  1996  1997  1998  1999
annual  average
World  203.1  (100%)  390.8  471.9  687.1  799.9 (100%)
Developed  Countries  182.5  (90%)  332.0  404.2  651.9  731.8  (92%)
Developing  & Transition  Countries  20.5  (10%)  57.8  64.3  33.0  65.6  (8%)
CEE  and  CIS  0.1  (0.5%)'  1.1  3.4  2.2  2.5  (3.8%)'
Russia  0.06 (0.3%)  0.8  2.6  1.0  2.1  (3.2%)-
Hungary  0.01  (0%)  -0.003  0.4  0.5  0.3  (0.5%)
Poland  0.02 (0.1  %)  0.05  0.05  0.3  0.2  (0.3%)
China  1.6  (7.6%)'  2.1  2.6  2.6  2.5  (3.8%)'
India  0.02  (0.1%)'  0.24  0.11  0.05  0.17 (0.3%)
Brazil  0.48 (2.3%)'  0.52  1.67  2.61  1.4 (2.1%)
* Percentage  of total  developing  and transition  countries'  flows
Source: UNCTAD  (2000)
Table 3 indicates that with respect to the gross inward stock of FDI, between 1985 and 1999 the
global share accounted for by developing and transition countries increased from 29 percent to 31 percent
and there was a corresponding decrease in the share held by developed countries.  For the CEE and CIS,
the stock of inward FDI rose rapidly through the 1990s, and their share of the total for developing and
transition countries increased by a factor of 10. Consistent with the data on inflows, Russia's gross stock
of inward FDI has increased since the start of its transition (particularly in 1998, reflecting the rise in
inflows during 1997), but by end-  1999, Russia accounted for approximately I percent of the total inward
stock for developing and transition economies.
The pattern of the gross outward stocks of FDI, as shown in Table 4, indicates an increase in the
global share for developing and transition economies since the mid-  I 980s. The increase for the CEE and
CIS has been substantial over the period, particularly due to Russia's outward stock of FDI, which totaled
more than US$ 8.5 billion in 1999.
5Table 3:  Global Gross FDI Stocks: Inward
(billions  of dollars  and percenta  es)
1985  1990  1995  1998  1999
World  763.4 (100%)  1,761.2  2,743.4  4,0i5.3  4,772.0 (100%)
Developed  Countries  545.2 (71%)  1,380.8  1,967.5  2,690.1  3,230.8 (68%)
Developing & Transition Countries  218.1 (29%)  377.4  739.5  1,241.0  1,438.5 (31%)
CEE  and CIS  - 3.0 (0.8%)'  40.4  97.6  119.0 (8.3%)
Russia  - 5.5  14.2  16.5  (I. I  %o)'
Hungary  - 0.6 (0.2%)'  10.0  15.9  19.1 (1.3%)'
Poland  - 0.1  (0%)'  7.8  22.5  30.0  (2.1%)'
China  10.5  24.8 (6.6%)'  137.4  265.6  306.0 (21.3%)'
India  1.1  1.6  (0.4%)'  5.6  14.2  16.4  (1.1%)'
Brazil  25.7  37.1  (10%)'  42.5  132.7  164.1 (11.4%)'
* Percentage  of total  developing  and transition  countries'  stocks
Source: UNCTAD  (2000)
Table 4: Global FDI Stocks: Outward
(billions  of dollars  and percent  ges)
1985  1990  1995  1998  1999
World  707.1 (100%)  1,716.4  2,870.6  4,065.8  4,759.3 (100%)
Developed  Countries  674.7 (95%)  1,634.1  2,607.1  3,650.0  4,277.0 (90%)
Developing & Transition Countries  32.4  (5%)  81.9  258.3  403.9  468.7  (10%)
CEE  and  CIS  0.025  0.4 (0.5%)'  5.3  11.9  13.6 (3%)'
Russia  - 3.01  7.38  8.6 (1.8%)'
Hungary  - 0.2  (0.2%)'  0.383  1.10  1.6 (0.3%)'
Poland  0.03  0.1  (0.1%).  0.539  1.165  1.4 (0.2%)*
China  0.1  2.5  (3%)'  15.8  23.1  25.6 (5 5%)'
India  0.2  0.3 (0.4%)'  0.5  0.9  1.1  (0.2%)'
Brazil  1.4  2.4 (2.9%)'  5.9  10.7  12.1  (2 6%)'
* Percentage  of total  developing  and transition  countries'  stocks.
Source: UNCTAD  (2000)
Trends and Distribution of FDI Within RussiaI0
Our  focus  in  this  paper  is  the  inter-regional  pattern  of  inward  FDI.  Table  5  presents
disaggregated  data  on  annual  net  FDI  inflows  for  each  of  the  89 regions  for  1995-1999.  These  data
indicate  clearly  there  is significant  variation  in terms  of  absolute  levels  of  FDI  inflows  across  Russia's
regions.
10  The data on regional flows and stocks of FDI within Russia are from Goskomstat, which is the only source of
inter-regional data on FDI in Russia. As noted above, Goskomstat FDI data differ from those from the CBR
and UNCTAD.
6Table 5: Russian Net FDI Inflows by Region
(thousands of dollars)
FDI 1995  FDI 1996  FDI 1997  FDI 1998  FDI 1999
Northern Region
Karelia Republic  16017  2301  3659  5137  4532
Komi Republic  4751  22242  7524  22796  41109
Arkhangelsk Oblast  3142  3940  14941  10489  400
Vologda Ob]ast  3564  9304  10007  922  5613
MurmanskOblast  2776  2550  2331  2188  8153
North-Western Region
St Petersburg city  145643  113026  149370  259866  272014
Leningrad Oblast  20484  43692  75599  90568  236169
Novgorod Oblast  19268  5922  11270  7584  32702
Pskov Oblast  609  8462  1011  1870  1544
Central Region
Bryansk Oblast  4409  3716  1821  81  1383
Vladimir Oblast  6366  11334  14769  39177  38527
Ivanovo Oblast  764  0  4653  120  361
Kaluga Oblast  880  1072  674  65181  92102
Kostroma Oblast  21  460  30  1874  1490
Moscowcity  1024173  1031888  4117916  803255  787590
Moscow Oblast  206117  413001  72112  637083  390022
Oryol Oblast  18301  19764  39662  33043  16936
Ryazan Oblast  2553  1046  10581  4094  1340
Smolensk Oblast  3214  4043  683  157  75
Tver Oblast  188  217  285  4414  1953
Tula Oblast  1157  20780  34918  29905  5735
Yaroslavl Oblast  529  3764  12132  5949  4631
Volgo-Viatskiy Region
Mari-El Republic  739  1378  17
Mordovia Republic  2130  274  1690  4284  604
ChuvashRepublic  1102  89  1560  1810  2157
Kirov Oblast  895  593  827  64  5
NizhnyNovgorod Oblast  10421  101238  20814  3958  13801
Tsentralno-Chernozemny  Region
Belgorod Oblast  136  173  270  4649  8390
Voronezh Oblast  1026  18216  812  1941  16510
Kursk Oblast  765  1766  1294  13452  10685
Lipetsk Oblast  3019  5670  523  6396  12150
Tambov Oblast  6  83  67  3357
Povolzhkiy Region
Kalmyk Republic  1641
Tatarstan Republic  65084  18800  21526  2649  4316
Astrakhan Oblast  207  1250  853  6261  12136
Volgograd Oblast  17765  21796  30864  76028  53061
Penza Oblast  1191  322  2683  2287  253
Samara Oblast  44745  29594  68210  185857  76322
Saratov Oblast  27265  7642  14331  4950  3099
Ulyanovsk Oblast  266  104  2364  10  280
Adygeya Republic  48  25  648  947
Dagestan Republic  56  62  8398  53
Ingushetiya
Kabardino-Balkar Republic  2476  285  254  450
Karachaevo-Cherkess  Republic  30  78  3069
Northem Ossetia & Alaniya
7Chechnya
KrasnodarKrai  18146  22566  15032  153082  495551
Stavropol Krai  20882  23719  36139  11810  4468
Rostov Oblast  160  24168  13558  2639  12352
Ural Region
Bashkortostan Republic  3850  6329  8050  5624  12480
Udmurtia Republic  5883  1688  7073  1684  278
Kurgan Oblast  29  89  4  910  1
Orenburg Oblast  694  2028  421  74866  5646
Perm Oblast  15635  33113  7595  4282  22350
Komi-Permyatskiy Autonomous Okrug
Sverdlovsk Oblast  801  12639  68438  118904  79191
Chelyabinsk Oblast  24355  8445  26684  51315  90572
Western-Siberia Region
Altai Republic  5
Altai Krai  29336  45231  19129  5976  8436
Kemerovo Oblast  1897  780  1935  222  2406
Novosibirsk Oblast  10201  20791  50713  159130  130978
Omsk Oblast  2498  254  3320  12122  1495
Tomsk Oblast  16455  2975  768  17  1720
Tyumen Oblast  32613  30423  65369  90685  107299
Eastern-Siberian  Region
Buryat Republic  997  144  214  2067  72
Tyva Republic  2015
Khakasia Republic  1300  229  0
Krasnoyarsk Krai  2054  678  33491  7638  5571
Taymyrskiy  Autonomous Okrug
Evenkiyskiy  Autonomous Okrug
Irkutsk Oblast  19840  6976  5480  51923  15550
Ust'-Ordynskiy  Buryatskiy Autonomous Okrug  2
Chita Oblast  174  634  241  27  28
Aginskiy Buryatskiy Autonomous Okrug  15
Far-Eastern Region
Sakha Republic (Yakutia)  5243  7839  9798  871  438
Jewish Autonomous Oblast  31  342  452  50
Chukotka
Primorskii Krai  23172  65460  60924  46084  19867
KhabarovskKrai  33254  77851  11606  14819  24734
Amur Oblast  924  1025  318  414  2260
Kamchatka Oblast  836  1848  1921  7181  42
Magadan Oblast  19785  45231  61630  48690  26948
SakhalinOblast  49619  42900  49046  131925  1022384
Kaliningrad Oblast  12703  21504  10630  9210  4089
RUSSIA  2045677  2467113  5357734  3422470  4335405
Source: Goskomstat
To put these absolute levels in a more economically meaningful perspective, Table 6 showvs  the
regional  FDI  inflows  data  cumulated  over  the  1995-99 period,  the  share of  the  national  total  of
cumulative FDI inflows accounted for by each region, and scalar variables, such as regional FDI inflows
per capita, regional FDI inflows per square kilometer, and gross regional product (regional levels and
shares of national total).  The table shows that of total cumulative FDI inflows to Russia over the 1995-
99 period, 62% went to just four regions, all of which are in the western portion of the country-Moscow
City/Moscow Oblast (54%) and St. Petersburg City/Leningrad Oblast (8%).  Apart from Sakhalin Oblast
(7.4%) in the Far East and Krasnodar Krai (4%) in the South, no other region in Russia accounts for
8Table  6: Russian  Cumulative  FDI and Scalar  Dimensions  by Region
Cumulative  FDI  Share  of Total  FDI  Inflows  FDI  Inflows  per  Gross  GRP  Shares,
Inflows, 1995-99  Cumulative  FDI,  per Capita,  1000 Sq Km, 1999  Regional  1997
1995-99  1999  Product, 1997
('000 US dollars)  (°)  (US dollars)  ('000 US dollars)  (bil. Rubles)  (%)
Northern Region
Karelia Republic  31646  0.2%  5870466  183.56  10067  0.4%
Komi Republic  98422  0.6%  35778068  236.65  27177  1.2%
Arkhangelsk  Oblast  32912  0.2%  270453  56.03  19245  0.8%
Vologda Oblast  29410  0.2%  4210803  201.85  20803  0.9%
Murmansk  Oblast  17998  0.1%  8153000  124.21  19018  0.8%
North-Western  Region
St Petersburg city  939919  5.3%  57532572  75784  3.3%
Leningrad Oblast  466512  2.7%  140493159  16372.89  19456  0.8%
Novgorod Oblast  76746  0.4%  44432065  1387.81  7729  0.3%
Pskov Oblast  13496  0.1%  1901478  244.05  6956  0.3%
Central Region
BryanskOblast  11410  0.1%  949863  326.93  12337  0.5%
Vladimir Oblast  110173  0.6%  23738139  3799.07  15265  0.7%
Ivanovo Oblast  5898  0.0%  292071  270.55  8847  0.4%
Kaluga Oblast  159909  0.9%  84497248  5348.13  10919  0.5%
Kostroma Oblast  3875  0.0%  1878941  64.48  8835  0.4%
Moscow city  7764822  44.2%  91261877  ---  320085  13.8%
Moscow Oblast  1718335  9.8%  59572629  201769.30  97420  4.2%
Oryol Oblast  127706  0.7%  18734513  5170.28  8890  0.4%
Ryazan Oblast  19614  0.1%  1033951  495.30  14405  0.6%
Smolensk Oblast  8172  0.0%  65331  164.10  12030  0.5%
Tver Oblast  7057  0.0%  1204812  83.91  16213  0.7%
Tula Oblast  92495  0.5%  3241945  3599.03  16577  0.7%
Yaroslavl Oblast  27005  0.2%  3247546  741.90  21093  0.9%
Volgo-Viatskiy Region
Mari-El Republic  . 91.98  6221  0.3%
MordoviaRepublic  8982  0.1%  643923  342.82  9331  0.4%
Chuvash Republic  6718  0.0%  1586029  367.10  11574  0.5%
Kirov Oblast  2384  0.0%  3121  19.74  17369  0.8%
NizhnyNovgorod Oblast  150232  0.9%  3748235  1953.60  52944  2.3%
Tsentralno-
Belgorod Oblast  13618  0.1%  5623324  502.51  18154  0.8%
Voronezh Oblast  38505  0.2%  6670707  734.83  25737  1.1%
Kursk Oblast  27962  0.2%  8051997  938.32  15404  0.7%
Lipetsk Oblast  27758  0.2%  9759036  1151.78  15737  0.7%
Tambov Oblast  2618565  102.42  9434  0.4%
Povolzhkiy Region
KalmykRepublic  1641  0.0%  . 21.56  1789  0.1%
Tatarstan Republic  112375  0.6%  1141799  1652.57  67160  2.9%
AstrakhanOblast  20707  0.1%  11828460  469.55  11223  0.5%
Volgograd Oblast  199514  1.1%  19695991  1751.66  32496  1.4%
Penza Oblast  6736  0.0%  164073  155.93  12951  0.6%
Samara Oblast  404728  2.3%  23071947  7550.90  72603  3.1%
Saratov Oblast  57287  0.3%  1138920  571.73  31768  1.4%
Ulyanovsk Oblast  3024  0.0%  189573  81.07  16565  0.7%
Northern Caucasus
Adygeya Republic  2104444  219.47  2554  0.1%
9Dagestan Republic  . 170.36  9165  0.4%
Ingushetiya  . 0.00  956  0.0%
Kabardino-Balkar  Republic  . . 277.20  5441  0.2%
Karachaevo-Cherkess  Republic  . . 225.32  2748  0.1%
Northern Ossetia & Alaniya  . . 0.00  3406  0.1%
Chechnya
KrasnodarKrai  704377  4.0%  97741815  9268.12  48950  2.1%
StavropolKrai  97018  0.6%  1661584  1458.92  25679  1.1%
RostovOblast  52877  0.3%  2817518  524.57  35062  1.5%
Ural Region
Bashkortostan Republic  36333  0.2%  3031333  253.02  64557  2.8%
Udmurtia Republic  16606  0.1%  169927  394.44  22114  1.0%
Kurgan Oblast  1033  0.0%  907  14.55  9088  0.4%
Orenburg Oblast  83655  0.5%  2532974  674.64  30594  1.3%
PermOblast  82975  0.5%  7502518  516.66  51531  2.2%
Komi-PerTnyatskiy  . 0.00
Sverdlovsk Oblast  279973  1.6%  17063348  1437.23  73923  3.2%
ChelyabinskOblast  201371  1.1%  24585233  2290.91  51467  2.2%
Western-Siberia  Region
Altai Republic  . 0.05  1477  0.1%
Altai Krai  108108  0.6%  3166667  639.31  22052  1.0%
Kemerovo Oblast  7240  0.0%  799867  75.81  48779  2.1%
Novosibirsk Oblast  371813  2.1%  47593750  2086.49  39073  1.7%
Omsk Oblast  19689  0.1%  686410  140.94  33787  1.5%
Tomsk Oblast  21935  0.1%  1604478  69.22  21300  0.9%
Tyumen Oblast  326389  1.9%  33260694  227.42  209198  9.0%
Eastern-Siberian  Region
Buryat Republic  3494  0.0%  69164  9.95  11541  0.5%
Tyva Republic  . 11.82  1804  0.1%
Khakasia Republic  0  24.70  8032  0.3%
Krasnoyarsk Krai  49432  0.3%  1818805  21.13  65482  2.8%
Taymyrskiy Autonomous  . 0.00
Evenkiyskiy Autonomous  . 0.00
Irkutsk Oblast  99769  0.6%  5625904  129.92  56083  2.4%
Ust'-Ordynskiy  Buryatskiy  13889  0.09
ChitaOblast  1104  0.0%  22065  2.56  12738  0.6%
Aginskiy Buryatskiy Aut.  . 0.79
Far-Eastern  Region
Sakha Republic (Yakutia)  24189  0.1%  443320  7.79  29960  1.3%
Jewish Autonomous Oblast  . 246305  24.31  1300  0.1%
Chukotka  . 0.00  2389  0.1%
Primorskii  Krai  215507  1.2%  9042786  1299.02  30546  1.3%
KhabarovskKrai  162264  0.9%  16123859  205.76  31381  1.4%
Amnur  Oblast  494]  0.0%  2226601  13.59  15665  0.7%
KamchatkaOblast  11828  0.1%  107692  25.04  8146  0.4%
Magadan Oblast  202284  1.2%  112283333  438.41  6402  0.3%
Sakhalin Oblast  1295874  7.4%  1681552632  14878.00  13369  0.6%
Kaliningrad Oblast  58136  0.3%  4299685  3850.07  8466  0.4%
_RUSSIA  17617399  100%  2313816  100.0%
Source: Goskomstat
more than 2.5% of the country's total cumulative inflows. Yet these four regions taken together account
for only 22% of the gross national product of Russia (Table 6) and only 13% of Russia's population.
Moscow City and Moscow Oblast in particular are the major hosts for FDI in Russia.  In 1995
these two regions combined accounted for  59% of total  inflows, and  in  1997 their combined share
10increased, accounting for 78% of total inflows (Table 5).  While in 1998 and 1999 their combined shares
dropped  significantly to  41%  and  28%,  respectively-owing  to  the  major  oil  investment made  in
Sakhalin Oblast and thus producing some evening out of the regional pattern of FDI inflows on an annual
basis-the  two regions combined still account for the largest national shares. I  I
It is thus apparent that within Russia there  is a strikingly skewed distribution of FDI inflows
across the regions. We now turn to analyzing empirically why this is the case.
II.  Towards a Model of the Determinants of FDI Within Russia
Hypothesis Development
A large volume of theoretical and empirical literature is devoted to the determinants  of the spatial
distribution of FDI-but  usually in the inter-country context.  In summary, the theories include, among
other approaches,  the early Hechsher-Ohlin  model and trade models, which emphasize FDI emanating  from
differentials in the endowments  of capital and labor between countries and FDI as a response to overcome
barriers to  imports;12  the product life cycle model, which regards FDI as a  way of firms to  capture
remaining profits by expanding overseas to yet un-penetrated markets;1 3 and the industrial organization
theory of FDI, which focuses on FDI as the natural outcome of international  oligopolistic  rivalry, including
a follow-the-leader  type of game.1 4
In the main, building on these theoretical paradigms, the empirical studies, using either cross-
country regression analysis or interviews of foreign investors among host countries, generally show that
various economic development characteristics-such  as market size, labor costs, access to raw materials
and infrastructure development-are  the major inter-country determinants of FDI.' 5 Empirical work
focusing on  Central and  Eastern  Europe  provides  similar  results,  suggesting that  even  during  the
transition process the most important determinants of foreign direct investment are (i) market size, (ii)
access to  domestic markets, (iii)  low costs  of production and  raw materials and  (iv)  infrastructure
development. An additional key factor seemingly important for these countries is the existence of special
economic incentives.
Relatively less attention has been given to exploring intra-country determinants of FDI and to the
importance of geography and  locational elements; the state of institutional development and structural
policy reforms; and political economy factors.1 6 Our basic thesis is that these latter factors are likely to
be as important as the aforementioned economic variables to explain cross-regional differences in FDI,
especially within economies that are undergoing major transitions from central planning and exhibiting
nascent market institutions like Russia.
l  See Table  5 and  Bradshaw  (2000).
12 Markusen  (1995).
13  Vernon  (1966).
14  Knickerbocker  (1973).
15Caves  (1989).
16  An exception  is Manaenkov  (2000).
11The Dependent Variable
The dependent variable employed in our model is the net inflows of FDI in each region at year-
end for the years 1995 to 1999, as calculated by Goskomstat. In some cases we cumulate these flows
across the five years, and in other cases we test the model on an annual basis.
The Explanatory Variables
Building on the literature we posit that four broad factors are likely to influence the distribution of
FDI flows across Russia's regions, as described by the following general equation:
FDI =  f  (ECONOMIC  CHARACTERiSTiCS,  PHYSICAL  INFRASTRUCTURE  DEVELOPMENT,
POLICYFRAMEWORK,  STATE  OF  CIVICSOCIETYAND  INSTITUTIONAL  DEVELOPMENT)  (1)
Equation (1) suggests that the FDI distribution across regions is a function of economic conditions,
policy framework, physical infrastructure and institutional development. But how can we proxy for these
broadly defined factors?  Next, we introduce four sets of variables that attempt to measure these factors
so as to capture the differences existing across Russia's regions.
Economic Characteristics: The economic condition of a region is certainly a key factor in the eyes
of  potential  investors.  Within  the  broad  concept of  "economic  characteristics",  we  specify three
variables to  capture different  dimensions of the  economic conditions  of  a  region that may  create
significantly different incentives for potential investors across regions: (i) market size; (ii) the costs of
productive inputs; and (iii) the quality of productive inputs.
Foreign investors, who  seek to  sell as well  as produce  in a  market, are  interested, first  and
foremost, in the economic potential  of the targeted region.  The level of a region's  Gross Regional
Product (the regional analog of Gross Domestic Product) clearly captures this potential. In particular, the
higher the Gross Regional Product,  the greater the potential  domestic demand, and, thus, the  more
attractive a region  should be to potential investors.  For our analysis we use the Gross Regional Product
(GRP) as calculated by the Russian regional branches of Goskomstat.
Potential market size is however only one side of the economic dimension story.  In their decision
whether or not to invest (and how much to invest), foreign investors are also influenced by both the level
of costs and by the quality of the inputs to be found in the targeted region.  Among the more important
inputs generally specific to a region is labor. Both the cost and quality of labor may play a key role in
affecting the decision to invest.  Regions where, for example, wages are higher, or the labor force is less
skilled, should find it more difficult to compete with other regions in attracting foreign investment. These
factors are likely to be especially important in the study of Russia, since the regional variation of wage
rates and human capital is significant.'7 We therefore include in our analysis the average annual wage of
workers (WAGE) and the average schooling rate (EDUCATION),'8 as reported by enterprises to the
regional statistical agencies.
17 See  Table  7.
18  Defined  as the percent  of persons  that  have  completed  a higher  education  degree  per 100,000  persons.
12Physical Infrastructure:  Economic conditions are not the  only factors considered by potential
investors.  The infrastructure development of a region is also important, since it indicates how difficult
and costly it may be to access suppliers and distribute to markets. The more developed, for example, the
road system in a region, the easier the access to markets and the lower the transportation costs, and, thus,
the greater the incentive to  invest in that region.  This intuitive relationship  is however difficult to
measure  since  physical  infrastructure  is  actually  multi-dimensional-from  roads  to  "telecoms"  to
railways to waterways and  so on.  In part because of the difficulty to  capture the many aspects of
infrastructure development, and in part because of the limited data available, we choose to include in our
models the length of paved road, normalized by size of region, (ROAD) as a measure of transportation
route density, as reported in Goskomstat's Regional Statistical Handbook.1 9 We expect the existence of
a positive relation between this variable and FDI flows.
Policy Framework:  The third  factor we believe may play an important role in explaining the
differential in regional flows of FDI is the local policy framework governing foreign economic activity.
In particular, policies introduced by  a  regional administration in Russia affecting foreign economic
activity can take the form of certain economic incentives or disincentives, for example, in terms of prices
charged  by  regulated  utilities;  tax  rates;  customs clearance;  registration,  licensing  and  inspection
procedures; anti-trust enforcement; access to financial services for handling of foreign exchange and/or
credit; among other policies, that may be different from those found in other regions.  Of course, these
policies take many forms and change often over time, making them difficult to quantify and measure their
impact.2 0
To try to overcome this obstacle, we use two variables. The first is a regional multi-dimensional
rating index calculated by  Ekspert magazine, a renown Russian-language periodical (akin to Business
Week)  geared to native Russian investors, founded in early 1995. The index ranks each Russian region on
the basis of its perceived business environment (INVESTMENT RATING). 21 Intuitively, we expect FDI
to be greater in regions that exhibit a higher rating. 22 However, interpreting the estimated coefficient of
19 We also  attempted  to use a measure  of the density  of Rail  Lines,  which  proved  not significant  (see  Appendix  1).
20 In addition,  proxies  for policy  measures  are very  likely  to be closely  correlated  with  the economic  status  of a
region,  introducing  into  our estimation  significant  multicollinearity  problems.
21 The index,  which  has been calculated  since 1996,  uses local statistical  information  to create an index that is a
weighted  average  of eight dimensions  of a region's business  environment:  (1) natural  resource  indicator;  (2)
productive  activity indicator;  (3) innovation  and science indicator;  (4) institutional  indicator;  (5) financial
indicator; (6) consumer  indicator;  (7) labor resource and education  indicator;  and (8) infrastructure  and
geographical  indicator.  Unfortunately,  the disaggregated  components  of the index  are not available.  We  use the
log of the inverse  of the Ekspert index and thus expect  a positive  statistical  relationship  between  this variable
and FDI.
22 Another  way to measure  the role of policies  on FDI flows is to capture the political  stance  of each region.
Regions  characterized  by a progressive  group  of politicians  are  more  likely  to attract  FDI  than other  regions. In
addition,  if foreign  investors  perceive  the political  situation  in a region to be unstable,  they might  prefer to
make their investment  elsewhere  to avoid the risk of a loss.  To capture these political dimensions,  we
constructed  variables  based on the 1996  and 1999  Presidential  elections  and on the 1995  and 1997  Regional
elections:  (i) Yavlinsky,  that  measures  the percent  of votes  obtained  by the Presidential  candidate  Yavlinsky  in
1996;  (ii) Zyuganov,  that measures  the percent  of votes obtained  by Zuyganov  in 1996;  (iii) Communist  1995
and Communist  1997,  that measure,  respectively,  the votes obtained  by the Communist  Party in the 1995  and
1997  regional  elections.  These  variables,  though  intuitively  appealing,  are not included  in our  model  since  they
are not significantly  correlated  with  FDI  nor statistically  significant  in our  regressions.
13an  ordinal,  ranking variable is diffictllt and  not  always meaningful.23  In addition, INVESTMIENT
RATING, because of its construction, is highly correlated with other explanatory variables included in
our  specification, introducing multicollinearity problems. Although we  try INVESTMENT RATING
despite these concerns, we settle on using it as an interactive variable, a specification we find much more
meaningful (see below). 24
The second variable related to the policy environment for foreign economic activity is the extent of
a region's openness to foreign trade.  As noted above, there is usually an important linkage between trade
and FDI flows.  Whether however these two variables are complements or substitutes is not clear a
priori.  On the one hand, greater openness to trade  may translate into less FDI if imports (or  even
possibly exports)  are substitutes for  direct  investment.  On the  other hand, trade  and FDI may  be
complements in the sense that a region that already is heavily engaged in trade with foreign cotntries
may appear, in the eyes of potential foreign investors, less risky and thus more attractive. We, therefore,
construct an index that captures openness to foreign trade based on the regional flow of imports and
exports, for 1997, defined as:
TRADE = (Imports + Exports) / GRP. 25
Civic Society and Institutional Development:  The state of institutions and the "quality" of civic
society are  likely to  be  important  factors that  influence foreign  investors'  decisions,  especially  in
transition  and  developing  economies.  For  example,  regions  with  a  strong  institutional  fabric,
characterized by adherence to rules-based decision-making, pursuit of due process, and high participation
by the population in civic activities may signal an inviting business environment.  In contrast, regions
characterized by widespread government interference in the marketplace, extensive use of discretion in
application of economic policies, corruption and crime are perceived by investors as riskier environments
in which to do business.
One obvious type of variable to be included as a measure of institutional development in these
regards would be an indicator of the strength of the legal institutions in place across Russia's  regions,
such as the quality of a region's  legal framework and/or judicial  institutions and so on.  Unfortunately,
good data on these facets of institutions are not systematically available at the regional level in Russia. 26
We had to settle on using the following two variables to capture strength of civic society and institutional
23 See  for example  Wooldridge  (2000),  Chapter  7, for a discussion  on the use  and interpretation  of ordinal  variables.
When  INVESTMENT  RATING  is used without  the interaction,  its coefficient  displays  the incorrect  sign and is
statistically  significant;  in  large part this perverse result is due to the high degree of collinearity  of
INVESTMENT  RATING  with  many of the other  variables  (see Appendix  I).  This  is not surprising  given  the
overlap  with some of the other variables  and some of the components  that comprise  this rating  index. Data
availability  problems  do not allow use of the disaggregated  ratings  described  in footnote  21, instead  of the
aggregate  one.
25  Using  Goskomstat  Trade  statistics.
26 We attempted  to use  rough  proxies  along  these  lines,  but  with  very  poor results.  We constructed,  for example,  an
index  of the quality  of the legal  framework  using  data on the maximum  number  of staffing  for  judicial  bailiffs
for each  region. Since  these  data do not indicate  the actual level of bailiffs  employed,  we decided not to use
them. We also tried to use the number of staff employed in the regional branches of the Ministry for Anti-
Monopoly Policy and Support for Entrepreneurship. However, this variable was not significant.
14development: (i) the crime rate in each region per 1000 person population (CRIME) 27 and (ii) the voter
participation rate in the 1996 Presidential election for each region (PARTICIPATION). Our expectation
is that the higher the crime rate - calculated as the number of reported crimes in a given year per 100,000
persons-the  poorer the state of institutional development and, thus, the less attractive is the region for
investors.  Similarly, the lower the voter participation rate, the weaker the civic fabric of a region, and
thus the smaller the incentive to invest.
At this juncture, the first approximation of our basic model is the following:
FDI =f (GRP,  WAGE,  EDUCATION,  ROAD, OPENNESS  TO TRADE,
INVESTMENTRATING,  CRIME,  PARTICIPATION)  (2)
However, we believe that there may be other variables missing from this empirical specification
that are likely to affect foreign investors' decisions. "Complementarity effects", based on the notion that
a region's attractiveness to foreign investors is driven by the region's attractiveness to domestic  investors
(and/or previous foreign investors), may play an important role. The geographical features of a region
constitute another set of potentially important variables in explaining intra-country patterns of FDI flows,
as recent studies suggest. 28 The underlying stability of the social fabric of a region may also affect
foreign investors' location decisions.
Complementarity Effects.  The  performance effects  of  the  presence  of  foreign  investors  and
domestic investors within a market has long been studied in the literature. Within Russia, these effects
are only recently being explored.29 Our main hypothesis in this respect is that in a complex business
environment like Russia, where  FDI remains overall quite  low (and thus  foreigners do not yet have
significant experience investing in Russia), the presence of significant domestic private investment in a
region may well serve as a catalyst for FDI flows to that-region:  all other things equal, regions that
exhibit a high level of private domestic investment send a  positive signal to foreign investors about
quality of the economic and institutional environment of these regions. Thus, we should observe higher
FDI flows associated with greater amounts of domestic private investment.  A similar argument can be
made regarding lagged FDI.  High levels of FDI  in the past may signal to potential current foreign
investors  the  soundness and  potential  of  a  regional  economy.  We  therefore  include among  our
explanatory variables (i) DOMESTIC PRIVATE INVESTMENT by region, derived from Goskomstat's
Regional  Handbooks,  for 1995 to 1998,30  and (ii) LAGGED FDI.
To overcome the problems mentioned above with INVESTMENT RATING and still capture the
effects of a region's policy framework on FDI flows, we choose to include in our model INVESTMENT
RATING as an  interaction term with  DOMESTIC PRIVATE INVESTMENT. Domestic investment
decisions are based on outcomes  of regional business policies.  This interaction term, therefore, measures
both perceived  and actual  outcomes of the business policy environment in each region, combining the
standpoint of a region's business environment in terms of how well that region is  perceived  by domestic
businessmen in a ranking compared to other regions, and the extent to which domestic investors in fact
act on that perception and actually make  investments.
27 Goskomstat  Regional Handbook
28 See,  for example,  Broadman  and Sun  (1997)  on China.
29  See,  for example,  Yudaeva  (2000).
30 We also  include  Domestic  Private  Investment  as a lagged  variable,  since  that  is consistent  with  our  hypothesis.
15Geography.  Russia  is  a  very  large  country-spanning  I I  time  zones-and  its  regions
(understandably) thus differ greatly in terms of geographical characteristics, for example, harshness of
climate, access to the sea, and mountainous areas.  Increasingly geographers and others are focusing on
the effects of such features on the location of industry within Russia, perhaps with greatest attention
recently being devoted to the locational effects of different climatic conditions. 31 To test the effects of
these geographic features, we include among our explanatory variables a set of dummies: 32
(i)  CLIMATE, a  dummy variable that  classifies  Russian  regions on  the  basis  of  the
harshness of climate; this variable takes on a value of 1 for regions with a milder climate, and zero
otherwise;
(ii) COAST, a dummy variable that reflects coastal location and takes a value of 1 if the
region has access to the sea; zero otherwise;
(iii) URALS, a dummy variable that separates regions between those located west of the
Ural Mountains and those located east of the Urals; it takes a value of 1 for regions located on the
East of the Urals, and zero otherwise;
(iv) PORT, a dummy variable that reflects access to sea trade and takes value of I if a major
port is located within the oblast, and zero otherwise.
Social Stability.  In cross-country studies of FDI, nations characterized by social unrest are less
attractive in the eyes of foreign investors because of the possibility of violence and other outcomes of
social conflicts.  Russia is a country with a rich composition of ethnic groups. Following the literature,
which approximates the propensity for social unrest by looking at the ethnic composition of populations,
we use Goskomstat data to calculate the percent of ethnic Russians living in each region (RUSSIAN).
The intuition is that the more ethnically fragmented a region is, the more likely the possibility of social
friction and thus the lower the level of FDI, all other things equal.
Finally, we introduce a variable due to the preponderance of FDI flows going to Moscow City and
Moscow Oblast.  That these two jurisdictions are outliers can be explained by several factors. First,
recorded FDI may be higher because Moscow was in the early- to mid-1990s the defacto  point of entry
for all FDI into Russia because the bureaucracy explicitly or implicitly required all foreign activities to
flow through the capital area. Foreign investors also may have perceived the institutional environment to
be more reliable in Moscow than in other regions during the early years of the transition. Finally, foreign
investors probably had  initially better access to information about potential markets in Moscow. To
control for these factors, we introduce MOSCOW, which measures the distance in kilometers from the
capital. 33
31  See,  for  example,  Gaddy  and  Ickes  (2001).
32  We  also  tried a measure  to portray  Oil Development  in each  region;  it was  not significant  (see  Appendix  1).
33 In addition  to introducing  the variable  MOSCOW,  we also  estimate  our  model  excluding  (i) Moscow  and (ii)
both Moscow  and St. Petersburg  from  the sample. The results  are presented  in Appendix  2.
16Because of the above considerations, we estimate variations of both equation (2) and equation (2'),
which includes our expanded list of variables:
FDI  =f  (GRP,  WAGE, EDUCATION, ROAD, TRADE, INVESTMENTRATINGXDOMESTIC  INVESTMENT,
CRIME,  VOTERPARTICIPATION,  DOMESTICINVESTMENT,  LAGGEDFDI,
CLIMATE,  URALS,  COAST,  PORT,  RUSSIAN,  Moscow)  (2')
IV.  Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations
Tables 7 and  8 summarize the basic statistics of what turn out to be the "core"  explanatory
variables in equation (2') and the bivariate correlations between them. 34 A quick examination of Table 7
suggests that five of these explanatory variables-GRP,  EDUCATION, TRADE, WAGE, DOMESTIC
INVESTMENT-differ  greatly  among  the  regions,  while  the  remaining  variables-VOTER
PARTICIPATION, ROAD, INVESTMENT RATING and CRIME-display  lesser degrees of regional
variability. The simple correlation analysis in Table 8 suggests that the following variables are the most
significantly  correlated with  all  measures of FDI used:  GRP, EDUCATION, TRADE, DOMESTIC
PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND INVESTMENT RATING.
Table 7: The "Core" Explanatory Variables
Variable  Basic Statistics
Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum
Wage  ('000  rubles)  1010.8  638.3  364.5  3660.1
GRP  ('000  rubles)  30768.3  53330.5  956.0  417505
Education  5129.1  6587.0  275.0  44660.5
Crime  1668.7  491.7  366.0  2849.0
Paved  Roads  (normalized  by  oblast  size)  11.4km  17.1  0.002  149.6
Voter  Participation  62.34%  7.63  33.4  76.9
Openness  to  Trade  0.25  0.58  0.014  5.08
Domestic  Private Investment  ('000 rubles)  97690  242100  0  1694100
Climate  0.1573  0.3661  0  1
Investrnent  Rating  -3.52  0.92  -4.489  0
34 For  additional  correlation  analyses-of  all of the variables-please  see Appendix  1.
17TABLE 8:  CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN FDI AND EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Variable  FD195  FD196  FD197  FD198  FD199  FDI(95-97)  FDI(95-98)  FDI(95-99)  FDI(98-99)  FDI(97-99)
Wage (1994-1998)
GRP  (1996-1997)  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +
Education  (1994-1998)  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +
Crime  (1994-1998)  - (1998)
Paved Roads (1997)
Voter Participation (1996)
Openness  to Trade  (1997)  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +
Domestic  Private  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +
Investment  (1995-1998)
Investment  Rating  (1996-  N.A.  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +
1998)
Lagged  FDI  N.A.  +  +  +  +  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  +  +
Climate
An empty box indicates that the correlation between the two variables was not statistically  significant;  a "+" indicates a positive statistically  significant
correlation; a "-"indicates a negative statistically significant correlation. For variables covering several years we report in parenthesis the year for which the
correlation coefficient is significant. If the year is not specified,  the correlation is statistically  significant for all years included in the sample.
The following  variables were not included in the table since their correlation coefficients  were never statistically significant:
Oil production, Rail lines, Yavlinsky,  Coast, Urals, Port, Russian and Moscow
For additional correlation analysis results, please see Appendix 1.Econometric Tests
Determinants of Cumulative FDI Flows. We first estimated several variants of equation (2')  for
cumulative FDI flows over the period 1995-1999. In the main, despite different empirical specifications,
much of our initial intuition tends to be supported: economic characteristics (market size), infrastructure
development, and policy environment appear to be the most important factors in explaining differences in
FDI flows across Russia's  regions.  Table 9 describes the results  of the  Generalized Least Squares
estimation 35 of equation  (2')  for  the  "core"  variables.  The results  of the correspondent estimation
procedure for other variants of this model with the additional control variables are not reported, since
none of the additional control variables is statistically significant and the qualitative results of Table 9 do
not change materially.
Table 9:  Determinants of Cumulative FDI in Russia, 1995-1999
Dependent  Variable:  FD195-99
Wage (1995)  -231.35
(-0.40)
GRP (1996)  12.59**
(3.62)
Education (1995)  14.07
(0.72)
Crime (1998)  122.76
(0.72)
Paved Roads (1997)  22012.7*
_______=______=.________=______==_______  (1.73)




Participation  Rate (1996  Election)  -385.80
(-0.04)
Private  Domestic Investment (1995)  3430.04**
(3.91)
Investment Rating x Domestic  580.29**
Investment (1996)  (2.56)
R-square  0.803449
Number of obs.  73
Every  regression  includes  a constant  terrn.
T-statistic  for  the HO:  coefficient=O  in parentheses.
**  Significant  at the 5%. * significant  at the 10%
35  We use  the GLS  procedure  rather  than  the basic  OLS to correct  for  possible  heteroskedasticity,  a common
problem  in  cross  sectional  data.
19The reported coefficient estimates for the model in Table 9 all have the expected sign except
CRIME  and  VOTER  PARTICIAPTION. Four  of  the  eight  explanatory  variables  included  in  the
regression explain about 80 percent of the  difference in the cumulative flows of FDI across Russian
regions  between  1995  and  1999.  In  particular,  GRP,  ROAD,  DOMESTIC  INVESTMENT and
INVESTMENT RATING  interacting  with  DOMESTIC INVESTMENT are  indicated  as  the  most
important factors in explaining foreign investors'  regional decisions within Russia over the  1995-99
period.
The  coefficients  on  the  remaining  variables  in  Table  9  deserve  explanation.  A  region's
OPENNESS TO TRADE, which serves as one proxy for the quality of the economic policy framework in
the region, does not seem to play a role in explaining differences in regional FDI flows in the mo(lel. 36
The bi-variate correlation analysis (Table 8) seems to suggest that FDI may not be a substitute for trade,
but rather that capital inflows and foreign trade may complement each other.  Although the coefficients
on WAGE and EDUCATION display the correct sign, they are not statistically significant. On the other
hand, the coefficients on CRIME and VOTER PARTICIPATION do not exhibit the correct sign and are
also not statistically significant.  The disappointing performance of these four variables can in part be
explained by  significant collinearity problems, detectable by the  strong correlation existing  between
these and other explanatory variables (see Appendix 1).
As mentioned above, we also estimate other combinations of equation (2').  Though the quality
of our results does not change, none of the other control variables is statistically significant. Once more,
the most likely culprit for this  lack of explanatory power is the high degree of collinearity among the
variables, as  highlighted by  the  correlation analysis  in  Appendix  1.  In particular, there  is  strong
correlation between Education, Wage, Domestic Investment, Investment Rating and the other Geography
dummies, Lagged FDI and Moscow. 37
To assess the impact of regional outliers on the robustness of our results, we estimate our "core"
model eliminating Moscow and St. Petersburg, from the sample,. As described in Appendix 2, our model
significantly  loses  explanatory  power,  displaying  an  R-square  of  0.502  and  0.325  for  the  model
eliminating Moscow and Moscow and St. Petersburg, respectively. Our results are robust only to the
elimination of Moscow, but not to the elimination of both regions. 38
To summarize this first-cut analysis, Russian regions that have sizeable market potential, better
developed infrastructure, played host to significant domestic private investment, and have more "market-
friendly" business environments have attracted greater amounts of FDI over the 1995-1999 period than
have other regions in the country.
36  We are aware  that  including  "Openness  to Trade"  (which  is calculated  for 1997)  among  the explanatory  variables
in the cumulative  FDI  regression  for 1995-1999  raises  potential  endogeneity  problems  between  FDI  (1995  and
1996)  and "Openness  to Trade". To detect  the extent  of these  problems,  we examined  the correlation
coefficients  between  Openness  to Trade  and  FDI  for each  single  year  of the sample. The  coefficients  are
statistically  significant  for all years  and do not exhibit  much  variation  (0.22-0.24).  This  simple  check  suggests
that our  regression  results  are unlikely  to be tainted  by endogeneity  problems.  The  use of this "stock"  variable
for 1997  to explain  a flow  over  5 years  may  however  be the reason  for its poor performance.
37  For a complete  description  of the statistical  results,  see  Appendix  2.
38 This  last set of results  reinforce  our concern  about  multicollinearity  problems  among  the explanatory  variables.
20Determinants ofAnnual FDI Flows.  Of course, in Russia the period between 1995 and 1999 was
characterized by a series of profound economic changes and dramatic events, first among all, the default,
ruble devaluation and economic crisis in August 1998.  A key question is whether or not as a result of
these events have the regions targeted by foreign investors changed? To better understand how the 1998
crisis may have affected the geographical determinants of FDI, we repeat our empirical exercise, using
our "core" model, but concentrating on the yearly flow of FDI to each Russian region.  The results of
these 5 estimation procedures are described in Table 10.
Table 10: Determinants of FDI in Russia - Annual FDI Flows, 1995-1999
Dependent:  FD11995  FD11996  FD11997  FD11998  FD11999
Wage (94-98)  -233.37  -19.19  -233.9  13.87  230.41**
(-1.46)  (-0.19)  (-1.23)  (0.49)  (3.61)
GRP (96-97)  2.40**  2.02**  7.73**  0.49  -2.47**
(5.12)  (3.67)  (4.46)  (1.40)  (-2.78)
Education (94-98)  0.436*  2.83  -1.06  5.34**  12.20**
(1.65)  (0.89)  (-.10)  (2.95)  (2.74)
Crime (94-98)  -3.52  31.65  94.97  6.50  38.23
(-.15)  (1.32)  (1.25)  (0.37)  (0.93)
Paved Roads (1997)  809.42  5860.5**  14885.9**  33.42  -864.54
(1.28)  (2.44)  (2.04)  (0.08)  (-.85)
Openness  to Trade  46468.6  -6939.6  -186035.23  -5588.8  -5435.9
(1997)  (0.72)  (-.78)  (-.07)  (-0.11)  (-.05)
Climate  61897.2  72340.9  325439.4**  -8881.8  -224218.6**
(1.36)  (1.48)  (2.26)  (-.30)  (-3.04)
Voter Participation  518.18  -482.85  -1982.1  -248.85  -653.46
(1996  Election)  (0.36)  (0.32)  (-0.44)  (-0.27)  (-.28)
Private  Domestic  437.37**  1177.0**  348.57**  235.74**
Investment (95-98)  (3.19)  (2.79)  (8.01)  (5.26)
(lagged - 2)
Investment Rating x  --  72.58**  194.29*  125.31**  49.72**
Domestic Investment  (2.04)  (1.80)  (6.20)  (2.08)
(96-98)
R-square  0.734722  0.802075  0.798558  0.931102  0.661237
Number of Obs.  69  69  68  68  68
Every regression  includes  a constant term.
T-statistic for the HO:  coefficient=0 in parentheses.
Significant  at the 5%. * significant  at the 10%
21We are especially interested in any change of behavior that may have occurred during or after
1998. Not surprisingly, the data highlights the existence of a significant change in the regional pattern of
foreign direct investment between 1998 and 1999.
For the early years of our analysis, 1995 through 1997,  the model produces results very similar to
the ones discussed above: GRP, INFRASTRUCTURE,  DOMESTIC INVESMTENT and INVESTMENT
RATING (in interaction with DOMESTIC INVESTMENT) are indicated as key determinants of' FDI
flows on an annual basis.  The coefficient on EDUCATION is statistically significant in 1995, and the
coefficient on CLIMATE is statistically significant in 1997.  The coefficient on WAGE always displays
the correct sign (although not statistically significant).  TRADE and VOTER PARTICIPATION, as
above), do not yield statistically significant results.
In 1998, however, we start to observe the first inconsistencies. The coefficient on GRP becomes
insignificant, as does that on ROAD.  Although the coefficient on EDUCATION is quite significant, the
sign on WAGE is incorrect.  The coefficient on CLIMATE while insignificant, displays the incorrect
sign. Only the performance of DOMESTIC INVESTMENT and INVESTMENT RATING (in interaction
with DOMESTIC INVESTMENT) remains as before.
Although the 1998 results could be attributed to the effects of the crisis, it becomes difficult to
explain the 1999 estimate results.  It appears that a structural change in the regional determinants of FDI
took place.  The explanatory power of our model declines from an average of about 82 percent over the
previous  four  years to  66  percent  for  1999.  While  DOMESTIC INVESTMENT, INVESTMENT
RATING  (in  interaction  with  DOMESTIC  INVESTMENT),  and  EDUCATION  are  statistically
significant, WAGE, GRP and CLIMATE all have the incorrect sign yet are statistically significant. The
coefficient on ROAD also displays the incorrect sign.
These findings are robust to  alternative specifications of the  model and to  the  inclusion of
different control variables.  As  in the analysis of cumulative FDI flows, none of the other  ccntrol
variables described in (2')  is statistically significant. 39 Interestingly enough, not even the inclusion of
Lagged FDI in the estimation of FDI1999 produces consistent explanatory power across the 5 years,
corroborating even more our claim that a structural change took place following the crisis in 1998.
These results-while  still  preliminary-suggest  that the  1998 default, devaluation and crisis
produced a significant impact on foreign investors' perceptions and confidence about regional conditions
in the Russian economy.  It also suggests that  in the aftermath of the crisis, the determinants of the
geographic pattern of foreign direct investment took a different route that the earlier model is not able to
capture adequately.
The challenge at this stage is to assess the durability of these changes. A starting point is clearly
to examine whether the alterations in the determinants of FDI observed in 1999 still appear in 2000.40 A
longer time horizon would facilitate the task of understanding whether 1999 was simply an outlier, or
whether the change was indeed "structural", as we suggest. In addition, more disaggregate information on
the institutional and economic characteristics of each region, separating the contribution of different
39 See  Appendix  2.
40 Goskomstat  has  not  released  official  data for  the year  2000. Only  preliminary  figures  are available.
22institutions to foreign investors' decisions, 41 would help us assess more clearly the determinants of FDI
flows in the new Russian economic environment.
V.  Conclusion
In this paper we have attempted to unbundle empirically the determinants of the geographic
distribution of FDI within Russia.  We have found that market size, infrastructure development, and
policy framework factors explain much of the observed variation of FDI flows across Russia's regions.
Further, and more interestingly, our results suggest that the model that explains well the cross-regional
variation in FDI flows from 1995-1998  changes significantly in terms of explanatory power following the
1998 crisis, suggesting a "structural regime change" in the FDI framework in Russia in the post-crisis
period.
While we believe our findings are robust, there are several extensions of our work that should be
pursued.  First, it would be important to know to what extent our finding of a "structural regime change"
in the regional determinants of FD1 in Russia since 1998 is transitory or more enduring.  To test this
hypothesis, a  longer time  horizon for  regional flows  of FDI, as  well  as more  current data on  the
explanatory variables, would be needed.
Second, the data on  FDI available from Goskomstat do not allow us to  carry out a sectoral
analysis of regional FDI flows. These sectoral differences may however be quite important in explaining
regional patterns of FDI. In addition, the availability of regional information on industry competitiveness,
such as seller concentration and barriers to entry, would enrich our analysis.
Third, and related to the previous point, our unit of analysis has been each Russian region, and
thus we measure FDI as the aggregate flow of FDI into each region.  Greater precision of our hypothesis
tests  would  be possible-e.g.,  in assessing the  complementarity effects  between FDI and  domestic
investment-if  data were available on annual FDI flows by firm, per region.  To our knowledge, such
firm-level data are not readily available, and would require extensive survey work.
Finally, as we noted in the text, due to data shortcomings, some of our variables may well be mis-
specified (for example, "Openness to Trade").  Further, and perhaps more important, our analysis suffers
from  multi-collinearity  problems  and  potential  missing  variables,  as  emphasized  above.  Clearly,
rectifying  these  problems,  by  enriching  the  data  set  and  using  alternative  measures  of  regional
development,  is a priority for further research.
41 As, for example,  the development  of financial  services.
23REFERENCES
Ahrend, R., "Speed of Reform, Initial Conditions, Political Orientation, or What?  Explaining Russian
Regions' Economic Performance." Mimeo. December 1999.
Ahrend, R., "Foreign Direct Investment Into Russia-Pain  Without Gain?" Russian Economic Trends,
June 2000.
Bergsman, J, Broadman, H. and Drebentsov, V., "Improving Russia's  Foreign Direct Investment Plolicy
Regime," in Broadman, H. (ed.) Russian Trade Policy Reform for  WTO Accession, The World Bank,
Washington, DC. 1999.
Bradshaw,  M., Regional Patterns  of Foreign Investment  in Russia, Royal  Institute of  International
Affairs, London, 1995.
Bradshaw, M., "Foreign Investment in Russia's Regions," Economist Intelligence Unit, Business Russia,
2000.
Broadman,  H.  and  Sun X.,  "The  Distribution of Foreign Direct  Investment in  China,"  The  Wforld
Economy, May, 1997.
Brown, D. and Earle, J., "Competition, Geography and Firm Performance Lessons from Russia," mimeo.
Stockholm  Institute of Transition Economics, August 2000.
Caves, Richard E. Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press, 1989.
Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS). Russia:  The Climate for  Foreign Direct Investment, The
World Bank, Washington, DC. August, 1992.
Foreign Investment Advisory Council (FIAC). Barriers to Foreign Investment in Russia. Government of
the Russian Federation, Moscow. 1994.
Foreign Investment in Russia: Trends and Prospects. Imperial, 1995.
Gaddy, C.  and  Ickes,  B.,  "The  Cost  of Cold".  Presentation at  the  Harriman Institute, Columbia
University, New York,, February 2001.
Knickerbocker, Frederick T. Oligopolistic  Reaction and Multinational Enterprise. Boston: Harvard
University Graduate School of Business Administration, 1973.
J.P. Morgan, Global Data Watch, May 8, 1998.
Manaenkov,  D.  "What  Determines  the  Region  of  Location  of  an  FDI  Project?  An  Empirical
Assessment", Working Paper BSP/36 E, New Economic School, Moscow, 2000.
Markusen, J.  "The  Boundaries of  Multinational Enterprise and the  Theory of  International Trade,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(2), 1995.
24OECD.  The Investment  Environment  in  the Russian  Federation: Laws,  Policies  and Institutions.
CCNM/Russia/IME(2001)3  OECD, Paris. March 2001.
Stem, N.  "Globalization and Poverty", Address given at the Institute of Economic and Social Research,
University of Indonesia, mimeo, December 2000.
UNCTAD.  Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of Development. World Investment Report-
1999. United Nations, Geneva.
Vernon, Raymond. "International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle." Quarterly
Journal of Economics 80 (May 1966).
Wooldridge, Jeffrey (2000), Introductory Econometrics, South-Western College Publishing, 2000.
World Bank.  Global Development Finance: Building Coalitions for  Effective Development Finance.
World Bank, Washington DC.  April 2001.
Yudaeva, K et al, "Does Foreign Ownership Matter?  The Russian Experience." Mimeo. New Economic
School, Moscow, October 2000.
25Appendix  1:  Additional  Correlation  Analysis
Description of additional variables utilized
Economic Characteristics:
- OIL : Production of Oil and Gas Condensate ('000 tons), 1997
Physical Infrastructure Development:
- Rail road per oblast: Operational Rail Lines (km of operational track), end-  1997
- Private Automobile Ownership (cars per 100 families), end-1997
- Urban Access to Residential Telephone Service (phones per 100 families), 1997
Policy Framework:
- Percentage of votes cast to the Communist Party in the Election of the State Duma, 1993, 1  995,
1999
- Percentage of votes cast to Presidential candidate Zyuganov in 1996 election
- Percentage of votes cast to Presidential candidate Yavlinsky in 1996 election
Geography:
- Coast, dummy variable; takes value 1 if oblast has coastline, zero otherwise
- Urals, dummy variable; takes value I if oblast includes Ural mountain, zero otherwise
- Ports, dummy variable; takes value 1 if oblast has major port, zero otherwise
- Moscow:  measure distance in KM from Moscow city
26TABLE A1.1:  CROSS-CORRELATION  BETWEEN  EXPANDED  LIST OF EXPLANATORY  VARIABLES
Dom.  -EducPae  Voter  Openn  Invest  Z  g  Yv  Comm  Geography
Variable  Priv.  Wage  GRP  a  Crime  Pad  Zyug  nsvy  unist  Moscow  Russian  Oil  dummies
Invest.  ~  ~  ~  ~  Rods  pation  trade  Rating  ao  sY  Party
Domestic  +  +  +
Priv.  Invest.
(95-98)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Wage  +(95-  +(94-  -(95,  -(94)  - +  -(94,  +  +  CL, CS, U
98)  96, 98)  96, 98)  96-98)
GRP  +  +(94)  +  - -(99)
Education  +(97)  -(99)  - +(96)
Crime  - +  +  +  +(94)  -U, +P  (94,95,
97)
Paved  Roads  +(U, CS) -P
(96,97)
Voter  +  -(U, P), +CL
Participation
Openness  to  +
Trade  .
Investment  -(96)  +  - -(98)  -U(96), -P,
Rating  __+CL
Zyuganov  +  -(CL,P,  CS)
I  +U
Yavlinsky  +  +(CS,P,  CL)
Communist  - -(93)  -(95)  -CS (95,99),
Party  +U,  -CL






An  empty box indicates that the correlation  between  the two variables  was not statistically  significant;  a + instead  indicates a positive statistically  significant  correlation; a -negative one. For variables  covering
several  years we report in parenthesis  the year for which the correlation  coefficient  is significant.  If the year is not specified,  the correlation  is statistically significant  for all years included in the sample.
Legend: CL: Climate  dummy; CS: Coast dummy; U: Ural dummy;  P: Ports dummyAppendix  2: Additional Regression  Results
(I) ELIMINATING  MOSCOW  AND  ST. PETERSBURG  FROM  THE SAMPLE
TABLE  A2.1:  DETERMINANTS  OF CUMULATIVE  FDI IN RUSSLI,  1995-1999
Dependent:  Dropping  Dropping
Moscow  Moscow and St.
Petersburg
Wage  561.22**  457.39**
(2.80)  (2.52)
GRP  -2.08  -0.61
(-1.52)  (-0.47)
Education  32.66**  6.67
(4.84)  (0.87)
Crime  75.63  72.03
(1.29)  (1.37)
Paved  Roads  3685.3  2301.6
(0.83)  (0.57)
Openness  to Trade  32106.5  -38832.5
(0.22)  (-0.29)
Climate  -241714.4**  -222196.9**
(-2.19)  (-2.24)
Voter  Participation  -1569.8  -1837.7
(1996 Election)  (-0.51)  (-0.66)
Private  Domestic  472.35  608.19**
Investment  (1995)  (1.43)  (2.03)
Investment  Rating x  60.26  71.11
Domestic  Investment  (0.74)  (0.97)
R-square  0.501530  0.325390
Number  of Obs.  72  71
Every regression includes a constant  termn.
T-statistic for the HO: coefficient=O in parentheses.
** Significant at the 5%.  * significant at the 10%(II}  INCLUDING  LAGGED FDI
TABLE  A2.4: DETERMINANTS  OF FDI IN RUSSIA  - FDI FLOWS, 1995-1999
Dependent:  FDI1996  FDI1997  FD11998  FD11999
Wage  8.74  -87.36**  31.59  238.63**
(0.38)  (-2.53)  (1.39)  (3.62)
GRP  -0.02  0.94**  -0.04  -2.58**
(-0.12)  (2.67)  (-.13)  (-2.74)
Education  -0.42  -11.36**  5.38**  12.19**
(-0.57)  (-6.12)  (3.72)  (2.66)
Crime  1.97  -18.51  -1.12  38.55
(0.35)  (-1.29)  (-0.08)  (0.89)
Paved Roads (1997)  337.65  -1286.68  -149.94  -989.82
(0.58)  (-0.92)  (-.45)  (-.93)
Openness  to Trade  -14667.9  -11827.98  -4102.03  14441.7
(1997)  (-0.71)  (-0.24)  (-0.10)  (0.12)
Climate  535.76  55576.7**  -26670.7  -235791.9**
(0.05)  (2.08)  (-1.11)  (-3.08)
Voter  Participation  (1996  178.48  652.43  -360.63  -941.1
Election)  (0.50)  (0.78)  (-0.48)  (-.06)
Private  Domestic  47.45  167.58**  101.75*  228.09
Investment  (lagged -2)  (1.42)  (2.09)  (1.87)  (1.38)
Investment  rating x  10.41  39.22*  38.92*  45.93
Domestic  Investment  (1.25)  (1.96)  (1.79)  (0.64)
Lagged FDI  (-2)  1.16**  3.48**  0.66**  0.02
(32.62)  (41.22)  (5.90)  (0.08)
R-square  0.990506  0.993940  0.957762  0.664885
Number  of Obs.  66  65  67  66
Every regression includes a constant  terrn. T-statistic for the HO: coefficient=O in parentheses.  ** Significant at the 5%.
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